§ . In words, all units that map into the same value of £ ¤ § are comparable, or "balanced," in the sense that, within each stratum of , treated and untreated units have the same distribution of characteristics
To see the significance of this result, let us assume, for simplicity, that £ ¦ ¤ § can be estimated separately and approximated by discrete strata is an outcome variable and that, eventually, our task would be to estimate the causal effect of on § . The -equivalence of © and merely implies that, if for any reason one wishes to estimate the "adjustment estimand" would be admissible as well, and we would then have an unbiased estimand of the causal effect,
accompanied by an efficient method of estimating the right-hand side. Conversely, if © in inadmissible, would be inadmissible as well, and all we can guarantee is that the bias produced by the former would be faithfully and efficiently reproduced by the latter.
The controversy surrounding propensity score
Thus far, our presentation of propensity score leaves no room for misunderstanding, and readers of this book would find it hard to understand how a controversy could emerge from an innocent estimation method which merely offers an efficient way of estimating a statistical quantity that sometimes does, and sometimes does not, coincide with the causal quantity of interest, depending on the choice of (Heckman 1992) . The popularity of the method has in fact grown to the point where some federal agencies now expect program evaluators to use this approach as a substitute for experimental designs (Peikes et al. 2008) . This move reflects a general tendency among investigators to play down the cautionary note concerning the required admissibility of former to "balance" treatment and control groups on important characteristics. Rubin has encouraged such interpretations by stating: "This application uses propensity score methods to create subgroups of treated units and control units ... as if they had been randomized. The collection of these subgroups then 'approximate' a randomized block experiment with respect to the observed covariates" (Rubin 2007) .
Subsequent empirical studies, however, have taken a more critical view of propensity score, noting with disappointment that a substantial bias is sometimes measured when careful comparisons are made to results of clinical studies (Smith and Todd 2005; Luellen et al. 2005; Peikes et al. 2008) .
But why would anyone play down the cautionary note of Rosenbaum and Rubin when doing so would violate the golden rule of causal analysis: No causal claim can be established by purely statistical methods, be it propensity scores, regression, stratification, or any other distribution-based design. The answer, I believe, rests with the language that Rosenbaum and Rubin used to formulate the condition of admissibility, i.e., equation (1.11). The condition was articulated in the restricted language of potential-outcome, stating that the set . As stated several times in this book, the opacity of "ignorability" is the Achilles' heel of the potential-outcome approach -no mortal can apply this condition to judge whether it holds even in simple problems, with all causal relationships correctly specified, let alone in partially specified problems that involve dozens of variables.
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The difficulty that most investigators experience in comprehending what "ignorability" means, and what judgment it summons them to exercise, has tempted them to assume that it is automatically satisfied, or at least is likely to be satisfied, if one includes in the analysis as many covariates as possible. The prevailing attitude is that adding more covariates can cause no harm (Rosenbaum 2002, p. 76) and can absolve one from thinking about the causal relationships among those covariates, the treatment, the outcome and, most importantly, the confounders left unmeasured (Rubin 2009).
This attitude stands contrary to what students of graphical models have learned, and what this book has attempted to teach. The admissibility of © can be established only by appealing to the causal knowledge available to the investigator, and that knowledge, as we know from graph theory and the back-door criterion, makes bias reduction a non-monotonic operation, i.e., eliminating bias (or imbalance) due to one confounder may awaken and unleash bias due to dormant, unmeasured confounders. Examples abound (e.g., Figure 6. 3) where adding a variable to the analysis not only is not needed, but would introduce irreparable bias (Pearl 2009 , Shrier 2009 , Sjölander 2009 .
Another factor inflaming the controversy has been the general belief that the biasreducing potential of propensity score methods can be tested experimentally by running case studies and comparing effect estimates obtained by propensity scores to those obtained by controlled randomized experiments (Shadish and Cook 2009) .
11 This belief is 10 Advocates of the potential outcome tradition are invited to inspect Figure 11 .8(b) (or any model, or story, or toy-example of their choice) and judge whether any subset of renders "strongly ignorable." This could easily be determined, of course, by the back-door criterion, but, unfortunately, graphs are still feared and misunderstood by some of the chief advocates of the potential-outcome camp (e.g., Rubin 2004 Rubin , 2008b Rubin , 2009 (Berk 2004) , recalls similar phenomena in social science, where immaculate ideas were misinterpreted by the scientific community: "I recall a conversation with Don Campbell in which he openly wished that he had never written Campbell and Stanley (1966) . The intent of the justly famous book, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research, was to contrast randomized experiments to quasi-experimental approximations and to strongly discourage the latter. Yet the apparent impact of the book was to legitimize a host of quasi-experimental designs for a wide variety of applied social science. After I got to know Dudley Duncan late in his career, he said that he often thought that his influential book on path analysis, Introduction to Structural Equation Models was a big mistake. Researchers had come away from the book believing that fundamental policy questions about social inequality could be quickly and easily answered with path analysis." (p. xvii) I believe that a similar cultural phenomenon has evolved around propensity scores. It is not that Rosenbaum and Rubin were careless in stating the conditions for success. Formally, they were very clear in warning practitioners that propensity scores work only under "strong ignorability" conditions. However, what they failed to realize is that it is not enough to warn people against dangers they cannot recognize; to protect them from perilous adventures, we must also give them eyeglasses to spot the threats, and a meaningful language to reason about them. By failing to equip readers with tools (e.g., graphs) for recognizing how "strong ignorability" can be violated or achieved, they have encouraged a generation of researchers (including federal agencies) to assume that ignorability either holds in most cases, or can be made to hold by clever designs. reach the same conclusion as an exactly parallel randomized experiment, see Shadish and Clark (2006, unpublished)" (Rubin 2007) .
